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Abstract 
This paper presents an ex-post assessment of  the current situation of  the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in light of  the conditions prescribed by the theory of  Optimum 
Currency Areas (OCA).  
The analysis shows that those conditions were satisfied at very different degrees. Factors mobility 
has clearly increased since the inception of  the Eurozone, with an important difference between 
free movement of  capital, which can be considered as fully accomplished, and labour mobility, 
which has improved, but to a lower degree. Prices and wages flexibility was initially lower 
compared to other regions, like the US, but has improved over time. The similarity of  business 
cycles among different economies joining the euro was a condition not respected at the 
beginning, which probably led to sustained imbalances within the Eurozone. Finally, fiscal union 
was the main missing element of  the initial construction of  the Eurozone, and still is. The 
common budget is so exiguous that its effectiveness as shock absorption mechanism is negligible. 
The analysis then shows how some of  the concerns raised on the eve of  the euro did actually 
materialize, even if  not immediately. First, in its first decade the Eurozone did not experience 
major turbulences, because growing financial integration was compensating the need for fiscal 
transfers, through the private insurance channel. Second, once the long-feared shock hit, the 
mechanism proved weak and non-resilient. The inherent weaknesses of  the EMU became 
evident. Third, as it had been foreseen, the cost of  the adjustment after the shock fell mainly on 
labour, with much higher and longer unemployment in the Eurozone than both non-Eurozone 
EU and the US. Fourth, as the theory suggested, the lack of  common mechanisms of  adjustment 
dramatically increased socio-economic divergences within the EMU. 
Keywords: EMU; Optimum Currency Areas; Socio-economic Divergences; Fiscal Union; 
Political Union. 
JEL codes: B22; E61; F15; F33. 
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The decision to establish a common currency in Europe had long been debated (Meade, 1957; 
Scitovsky, 1957; Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963), before it was actually taken and implemented. 
At the summit of  The Hague in December 1969 it was decided that the Community should 
evolve by stages into an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The objective of  a full EMU 
was explicitly stated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In 1999 the euro was introduced as the 
official currency of  11 Member States (MS) replacing national currencies2.  
This new institutional setting represented a peculiar monetary union, more integrated than past 
agreements of  fixed exchange rates, but still far from complete economic and political unions3. 
Monetary policies of  the participating Member States (MS) became the responsibility of  the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Fiscal policies remained responsibility of  national authorities, 
even though subject to restrictive common rules on public finances known as the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This created an unprecedented divorce between the main monetary and fiscal 
authorities (Goodhart, 1998).  
The reasons for such an ambitious experiment were mainly political, but several economic 
advantages were also expected: a reduction in transaction costs, promoting trade (Rose, 2000), 
and the elimination of  the exchange rate risks, favouring financial integration. At the same time, 
participating countries lost a great deal of  flexibility, renouncing to national monetary policies 
and to a mechanism for adjustment to shocks (Krugman, 2012). 
The theory of  Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), as developed by Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963), Kenen (1969), Fleming (1971), proposes a set of  necessary conditions for monetary 
unions and provides an analytical framework to assess risks and opportunities a region might be 
confronted with. This approach has been widely discussed in the literature (Robson, 1987; 
Bayoumi, 1994; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Goodhart, 1998; Alesina et al, 2002; 
McKinnon, 2004; Krugman, 2012; O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013), and it has been used to assess ex-
ante the feasibility of  the EMU (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969; Eichengreen, 
1991; Eichengreen, 1993a; Obstfeld, 1997, Alesina et al, 2002). 
The standard theory of  OCA was later on defined “exogenous”, in contrast to an “endogenous” 
approach (Frankel and Rose, 1998), which admitted the possibility that OCA properties, even if  
not fulfilled ex-ante, could be gradually satisfied during the existence of  the monetary union.  
Its applicability to the specific case of  the EMU has been rather controversial. The report “One 
Market, One Money” (EC, 1990), for instance, discarded the theory, explaining that:  
there is no ready-to-use theory for assessing the costs and benefits of  EMU. Despite its 
early insights, the 'theory of  optimum currency areas' provides a too narrow and 
                                                     
2 A 12th country, Greece, joined one year later. 
3 “Whenever states as in the USA or Australia, provinces as in Canada, cantons, lander, etc., have joined together in a 
larger federal unity, both the main political, the main fiscal and the monetary powers and competencies have 
similarly emigrated to the federal level. The Euro area will not be like that” (Goodhart, 1998). 
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somewhat outdated framework of  analysis. Recent developments in both micro- and 
macroeconomics have not yet led to a unified theory of  monetary unions (p.31).  
Critics of  the OCA theory highlighted that it lacks a formalized model allowing a measurement 
of  the “OCA test” for potential currency unions (Robson, 1987), that it has little or no predictive 
capacity (Goodhart, 1998), and that analyses investigating OCA properties are by necessity 
backward-looking (Mongelli, 2008).  
In this work, however, we apply the theory of  OCA to study ex-post the developments of  the 
EMU, following the main conditions for a suitable monetary union prescribed by the theory:  
• factors mobility (capital and labour) across the area;  
• price and wage flexibility;  
• similarity of  business cycles among participating countries;  
• common fiscal capacity as a mechanism of  shock absorption and risk-sharing.  
The paper analyzes each one of  these criteria, in order to assess to what extent they were satisfied 
before or during the EMU. The actual development of  the EMU is then put in perspective, 
comparing the lessons drawn from the theory with the current status. 
Sections 2 to 5 review the main conditions for OCAs and the extent to which the Eurozone 
complies with each of  them, section 6 describes the lessons for the EMU learnt from the theory, 
section 7 shows the actual developments of  the EMU during the crisis, section 8 presents a 
simulation of  a common fiscal capacity and section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Factors mobility 
Factors mobility was proposed as a key criterion to define an OCA since the seminal work by 
Robert Mundell (1961), who defined an OCA “in terms of  internal factor mobility and external 
factor immobility”. We can analyze in detail the degree of  mobility of  capital and labour in the 
EMU. 
 
2.1. Free circulation of  capital 
The free circulation of  capital has been established in Europe in parallel with the development of  
the single market. The complete liberalisation of  capital flows in the EU was not foreseen initially 
by the Treaties. The steps towards the EMU and the introduction of  the single currency required 
a stricter coordination, which brought to the Council Directive 88/361/EEC fully liberalising 
capital movements between residents of  the MS, by removing all remaining restrictions as of  1 




Today, Article 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions on the movement of  capital and payments 
between MS, as well as between MS and third countries. Even though some exceptions clauses 
were foreseen, since 1999 the safeguard clause to remedy crises in the balance of  payments is 
only applicable to those member states which are not part of  the Eurozone4. 
The criterion of  capital mobility can therefore be considered as fully satisfied by the EMU. 
Moreover, this growing financial integration is key to understand the development of  the 
Eurozone (Obstfeld, 2013). 
 
2.2. Labour mobility 
Labour mobility in the Eurozone has not reached the same extent as capital mobility, due to 
cultural and language barriers, and regulatory constraints. The measurement of  labour mobility 
has often been a complex topic addressed by many authors (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Diamond, 
1981; Pissarides, 1990; Layard et al, 1991, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Molloy et al, 2011). 
Many have also tried to study the specific case of  intra-EMU labour mobility (Eichengreen, 1991; 
Vandenbrande et al, 2006; Bonin et al, 2008; Fenge and von Weizsaecker, 2009; OECD, 2012; 
Kahanec 2012 and 2013; EPC, 2013), which is of  specific relevance for our purposes. 
A first, rough estimate can be based on the number of  foreign-born residents in each country. 
The Eurostat Labour Force Survey provides these data for each EU MS since 2009. The number 
of  foreign-born residents in each Eurozone country is increasing in both absolute terms (from 
35,650,225 in 2009 to 38,315,569 in 2012) and in relation to the total population of  the Eurozone 
(from 10.98% in 2009 to 11.53% in 2012). 
The comparison with the US can give an idea of  the degree of  labour mobility in Europe and of  
its importance as a mechanism for adjustment: Blanchard et al. (1992) explain how in response to 
an adverse shock in demand, relative nominal wages might decline, but in general they do not 
decline enough to prevent increases in unemployment. In the US, what they trigger is mostly 
labour out-migration, rather than job in-migration or job creation.  
Similarly, Krugman (1993a) shows that in the US relative higher unemployment of  some states is 
often reduced not so much by employment creation, but by reducing their labour force via 
outwards migration. The case of  Massachusetts, experiencing a hard recession at the end of  the 
80s after a big boom, is explanatory: it lost a relevant part of  its workforce, which never came 
back. This was the main driver of  unemployment reduction. 
Another way of  measuring the differences in labour mobility between the US and the Eurozone 
is by plotting the unemployment rates at two distinct points in time, in order to see whether 
differences among regions or states persist or not. 
 
                                                     
4 The legal basis is: Articles 63 to 66 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU), 
supplemented by Articles 75 and 215 TFEU for sanctions. 
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Figure 1: Unemployment in 1999 and 2012. Eurozone NUTS2 Regions and US States 
Source: Eurostat and US Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
 
We can observe that between 1999 and 2012 the differences in unemployment rates changed 
quite significantly among US states, the two series have in fact a low correlation (ρ=.382). If  we 
analyze the same differences among Eurozone NUTS2 regions, between 1999 and 2012, we 
observe that they tend to be quite similar, definitely more than in the US (correlation ρ=.727). 
While in the US labour mobility plays a role in reducing and rebalancing unemployment rates 
across states, in the Eurozone differences in unemployment rates are more persistent. Labour 
mobility, then, seems a weaker mechanism of  adjustment in the Eurozone, compared with the 
US. The figure suggests that unemployment in the Eurozone is a localized problem, with 
permanent differences among regions, and labour mobility has a limited impact in mitigating the 
problem. 
Molloy et al. (2011), however, have estimated the share of  the population in 2005 who actually 
moved residence in the previous year in EU MS in comparison with the US: they found similar 
mobility rates between the US and some EU MS.  
Recent analyses (EC, 2013; EPC, 2013; Dao et al, 2014) show that geographical mobility of  
workers as an immediate response to shocks in the EU is significantly increasing over time. The 
willingness of  Europeans to move to another MS for work doubled in the last three years; actual 
moves from deficit to surplus countries doubled and tripled in some Eurozone countries, during 
the last two years. 
Record-high unemployment levels as consequence of  the crisis in the countries of  origin 
exemplifies the growing importance of  “push” factors versus “pull” factors, in explaining the 
increasing labour mobility within the Eurozone (EPC, 2013). 
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To sum up, labour mobility has traditionally been one of  the “missing conditions” for the EMU 
as an OCA (Mundell, 1961; Eichengreen, 1993b). This situation, however, is definitely changing, 
with an increased flow of  workers from high-unemployment countries to the others. Which part 
of  this increase can be considered as a natural development of  the monetary union, in an 
“endogenous OCA approach”, and which instead depends on “push” factors created by the 
hardest crisis since the Great Depression, it is hard to say.  
The effect of  this higher labour mobility, however, is for the moment too limited to offset the 
huge rise in unemployment. A recent analysis by the ECB (2012) argues that the problem of  
unemployment in the Eurozone is mainly due to structural imbalances between labour demand 
and labour supply, rather than by a lack of  geographical mobility, suggesting a relatively smaller 
potential role for labour mobility in alleviating the mismatch. 
 
3. Prices and wages flexibility 
Price and wage flexibility is another key condition and an important mechanism for adjustment, 
alternative to the exchange rate (Friedman, 1953). The relevance of  price rigidity relates to the 
extent it transforms nominal shock into real effects, and for this reason wage flexibility can be an 
important adjustment mechanism.   
Friedman (1953) studied price and wage rigidities in comparison with the exchange rate, as 
alternative methods for adjustment. He highlighted the flexibility of  the exchange rate versus the 
inflexibility of  internal prices and explained that “if  internal prices were as flexible as exchange 
rates, it would make little economic difference whether adjustments were brought about by 
changes in exchange rates or equivalent changes in internal prices. But this condition is clearly not 
fulfilled”. Prices are more flexible upward that downward, but not all in an equal manner (Stiglitz, 
1999). The inflexibility of  prices, or different degrees of  flexibility, implies a distortion of  
adjustments in response to changes in external conditions. The adjustment takes the form 
primarily of  price changes in some sectors, and of  output changes in others. 
Price and wage flexibility in the Eurozone has been a controversial topic, due to the intrinsic 
difficulties of  its measurement. Dhyne et al. (2006) estimated an average monthly frequency of  
price change in the Eurozone of  about 15% and median price duration of  10.6 months. Bils and 
Klenow (2004) in a comparable analysis carried out for the US found an average monthly 
frequency of  around 25% and weighted median price duration of  4.6 months. According to these 
estimates, prices in the Eurozone seem stickier than in the US. 
In a comparative study between Europe and the US, Verhelst and Van den Poel (2010) analyzed 
the levels of  price rigidity in the two areas, based on frequency of  change. The use of  monthly 
data to study price stickiness showed similar levels of  price rigidity in the two areas, but when 
higher base frequencies were examined regular prices were found to be more flexible in the US 
than in Europe.  
Dhyne et al. (2009), however, propose a distinction between sticky and rigid prices: the first 
concept is based on the frequency, while the second on the extent of  the change of  prices. They 
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argue that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rigidity is the relevant one for policy 
purposes5. 
In their analysis of  price rigidity in the Eurozone, they find crucial differences for food and for 
service prices. While retail prices of  food change quite often, mainly because producer prices are 
very volatile, they actually exhibit substantial intrinsic rigidity. On the other hand, the low 
frequency of  price changes for services is due to the fact that the cost of  providing services is 
quite stable. The level of  intrinsic rigidity for services is actually moderate, similar to the level for 
manufactured products, for which prices change much more often. 
It seems plausible to argue that the level of  price rigidity in the Eurozone, in spite of  being still 
higher than in the US, is actually decreasing, approaching US levels. Alesina et al. (2008) found 
that that the adoption of  the Euro has been associated with an acceleration of  the pace of  
structural reforms in the product market, increasing price flexibility.  
Wages are, in general, more rigid than prices, but it seems that in the Eurozone they are following 
the same dynamics. The decline in real wage rigidity in Europe has been showed by Goette et al. 
(2007). 
In a comparative approach, Baddeley et al. (2002) studied regional wages in EU regions and US 
states, finding that wages do not seem to be more rigid in Europe than in the US. They observed 
a “significant variation across regions in the degree of  wage rigidity” within both the EU and the 
US, and conclude that “it would be incorrect – or certainly misleading – to attribute the regional 
unemployment problem in the EU wholly to wage inflexibility”. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Ebbinghaus and Kittel (2005) who focus on wage 
coordination. Their analysis shows that the variety of  bargaining patterns across European 
countries during the period 1971 to 1998 “contradicts a simple US-Europe juxtaposition”. They 
find that contrary to the expectations, the labour market actors in most European countries are 
responsive to the performance of  their bargaining system; they tend to adapt their system if  
wages seem to overshoot. Hence, they conclude, “the rigidity of  Europe thesis does not hold in a 
more detailed cross-national and long-term analysis of  institutional changes in wage bargaining”. 
Alesina et al. (2008) argued on this point that the adoption of  the euro does not seem to have 
accelerated labour market reforms in the “primary labour market”; however, the run up to the 
Euro adoption seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation. 
Konya and Krause (2011) precise that, according to their analysis, wages for already employed 
workers are more rigid in the Eurozone than in the US, but the rigidity of  wages for newly hired 
workers is small in both areas. This suggests that labour markets are becoming as flexible in the 
Eurozone as they are in the US, as far as new hires’ wage rigidity is concerned.  
                                                     
5 “A price is intrinsically rigid when it does not adjust, or only partially adjusts, to changes in demand and costs that 
have significant effects on the optimal price. A price is extrinsically rigid when the price does not adjust because 
demand and costs are stable and the optimal price does not vary much” (Dyhne et al, 2009). 
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For this criterion, as well, we could conclude that, in an “endogenous” approach to the theory of  
OCA, much progress has been achieved in satisfying it. 
 
4. Business cycles 
The similarity in business cycles has a particular relevance in monetary unions due to the fact that 
different countries become subject to a single, one-size-fits-all monetary policy (Frankel and 
Rose, 1998). If  countries forming a monetary union have similar cycles, the single monetary 
policy can therefore be suitable for all of  them. Different cycles between countries, on the 
contrary, lead to more asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, which can be amplified by the same 
monetary policy (De Grauwe, 2013).  
Some of  the MS joining the Eurozone had similar business cycles, but others were rather 
diverging. Greece, Ireland and Spain, in particular, had higher than average growth rates, inflation, 
and domestic demand. On the other side, countries like Germany or Italy had, at the inception of  
the EMU, very low growth rates, low inflation and stagnating domestic demand.  
Critical choices of  monetary policy were to be made by the ECB, and the decisive reduction in its 
key interest rate (-2,75% points between 2001 and 2004) was as beneficial to avoid recessions in 
the stagnating economies, as dangerous for fuelling asset bubbles in the fast-growing ones. 
In the absence of  an automatic rebalancing trough flexible exchange rate, it was argued that even 
the minimum structural divergences in business cycles are likely to amplify divergences in the 
balance of  payment (Friedman, 1953; Kaldor, 1971) and these differences are likely to persist 
(Fleming 1971). As a proof  of  this, Berger and Nitsch (2010) have demonstrated that trade 
imbalances among Eurozone countries have widened markedly after the introduction of  the 
common currency. This increase has a high degree of  persistence, which appears to lengthen the 
impact of  shocks on external accounts. 
The following figure shows the evolution of  several measures of  dispersion within the Eurozone: 
in periods characterized by flexible (or less rigid) exchange rates, even higher differences in the 
rates of  growth of  GDP, prices, and domestic demand, correspond to lower current account 
imbalances, while the opposite becomes true in the EMU. The rigidity of  the exchange rates, in 
the absence of  internal compensation mechanisms, amplifies enormously the impact of  








Figure 2: Dispersion (sd) of  Current Account balance (CA), GDP growth rates (G), Inflation (P), and Domestic 
Demand growth rate (D) in the Eurozone (1980-2012) 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of  AMECO, IMF and WB data. 
 
The condition of  similarity of  business cycles among countries forming a monetary union was 
not fully satisfied at the time the euro was introduced. However, this condition was subordinated 
to political decisions leading to a broader monetary union among more countries than those with 
similar business cycles (Eichengreen and Frieden, 1993). Since the inception of  the EMU, 
however, the degree of  internal divergences of  business cycles has gradually decreased. 
 
5. Fiscal capacity 
The fourth criterion for an OCA is a supranational (federal) mechanism of  fiscal transfers acting 
as an automatic stabilizer to mitigate asymmetric shocks (Kenen, 1969). This acts as a risk-sharing 
mechanism and implies a de-facto redistribution of  funds between different parts of  the union. By 
definition, being a mechanism for absorption of  unforeseen asymmetric shocks, the direction, 
duration and extent of  the redistribution cannot be pre-established or determined by law. 
It is clear that a high degree of  political and economic integration is needed for such a 
mechanism to be in place (Kaldor, 1971; De Grauwe, 2006). Political union is necessary to accept 
a risk-sharing, and economic union is needed to establish a sizeable common (federal) budget.  
The problem of  a common fiscal capacity at European level, as a necessary condition for a well-
functioning monetary union, was well known (see, for example the “Marjolin Report” in 1975 
and the “MacDougall Report” in 1977). However, since 1999 the EMU has been working with an 
extremely limited common budget, without a “built-in” fiscal stabiliser, and with an explicit no-
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bail-out clause in the Treaties: any risk arising from potential asymmetric shocks, would have 
remained national.  
The debate about fiscal federalism is quite a rich one (Kenen, 1969; Kaldor, 1971; Oates, 1972; 
Mundell, 1973; Eichengreen et al, 1990; Eichengreen, 1991; Feldstein, 1992;  Hallet et al, 1999; 
Buti and Franco, 2005; Sorens, 2008; Bordo et al. 2011), and has often used the US as a 
benchmark.  
The stabilizing role of  the federal budget in the US has long been discussed in the literature 
(Eichengreen, 1991). Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991) estimated that in the US:  
a one dollar reduction in a region's per capita income triggered a decrease in federal taxes 
in the neighbourhood of  34 cents and an increase in federal transfers of  about 6 cents. 
The final reduction in disposable per capita income was, therefore, of  only 60 cents.  
This means that in the US between one third and one half  of  the shock experienced by a state is 
absorbed by the Federal Government. As a matter of  comparison, they calculated that in the EU 
a one dollar shock to regional GDP will reduce tax payments to the common budget only by half  
a cent. This fiscal insurance scheme provided by the federal government is a key reason why the 
system of  fixed exchange rates within the US has survived without major problems. 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) similarly found that:  
in the US, redistributive flows from all federal sources amount to around 22 cents in the 
dollar, while stabilization flows are somewhat larger at around 30 cents in the dollar. In 
Canada, the redistribution flows are around double those in the US (39 cents in the 
dollar) but the stabilization flows are smaller (17 cents in the dollar). Taxes and transfers 
both play important roles in these flows. In the EC, there is no ‘fiscal federalism’; the EC 
budget is small and redistribution is limited. 
While the US has a bigger federal budget, as a share of  GDP, than the state level (24% vs 10%), 
the opposite happens in the Eurozone, where member states’ budgets account for a much bigger 
share (50%) than the common (federal) budget (1%). The comparable “federal” budget operating 
in the EU as a transfer mechanism between countries and regions is represented by the Structural 
and Cohesion Funds, which account for about 0.4% of  EU’s GDP. Solow (2005) even argued 
that the less the Eurozone represents an optimum currency area, the more it would need active 
fiscal policies for stabilisation. 
The fiscal capacity condition is clearly the least satisfied in the case of  the EMU (Eichengreen et 
al, 1990; Feldstein, 1992), it is considered as its “major design failure” (De Grauwe, 2013), and 
the comparison with the US gives a first idea of  the gap still to be filled.  
Some authors (Mundell, 1973; Eichengreen, 1992), however, suggested that a monetary union 
among countries keeping their fiscal autonomy could potentially compensate the lack of  a 
common fiscal capacity through the so-called ‘private insurance channel’, brought forward by the 
growing financial integration.  
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The absence of  exchange rate risks promoted financial integration among Eurozone economies, 
increasing financial flows from countries with balance of  payments in surplus and excess of  
savings (‘centre’) towards deficit countries with growing levels of  private indebtedness 
(‘periphery’).  
 
6. Lessons from the theory  
The histories of  past, successful, experiences of  monetary unifications tell us that political union 
may represent an important prerequisite for an effective economic and monetary union (Kaldor, 
1971; Feldstein, 1992; Goodhart, 1998; O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013). The EMU followed an 
opposite approach, based on the conviction that the monetary union could act as “a leaven for 
the development of  political union, which in the long run it cannot do without” (Werner report, 
1970). 
Others thought that it was “a dangerous error to believe that monetary and economic union can 
precede a political union” because “the objective of  a full monetary and economic union is 
unattainable without a political union; and the latter pre-supposes fiscal integration and not just 
fiscal harmonisation” (Kaldor, 1971). This idea was later on retaken by Feldstein (1992)6 and 
Friedman (1997) in their critics to the EMU project. Kaldor (1971) explicitly criticized the Werner 
plan for not envisaging that the main responsibility for public expenditure and taxation should be 
transferred from the national Governments to the Community. 
The subsequent “Marjolin Report” (EC, 1975) denounced that “there was no analysis, even 
approximative, of  the conditions to be fulfilled” to create an EMU. It fully recognized the need 
for a central authority “with a relevant important budget” 7, and for a “centralized fiscal and 
social security systems ensuring a certain degree of  redistribution”. It stressed the necessity of  
closer political and financial integration and went even further proposing a “Community 
Unemployment Benefit Fund”.  
Another report committed by the European Commission (the “MacDougall Report”, EC, 1977) 
analysed the stabilising role of  public finances in Europe, finding that inequalities between 
countries in the Community were not higher than regional inequalities within countries, and that 
the redistributive function of  the national budget at regional level reflected corresponding 
positions of  the regions in their balance of  payments on current account. The report found that 
within countries:  
between one half  to two-thirds of  a short-term loss of  primary income in a region due to 
a fall in its external sales may be automatically offset through lower payments of  taxes 
and insurance contributions to the centre, and higher receipts of  unemployment and 
                                                     
6 He suggested that advocating for a monetary union but rejecting any movement towards a federalist political 
structure for Europe was “a formula for economic costs without any of  the supposed political benefits”. 
7 The Report even quoted examples of  what was meant by “relevant”: the proportion of  the “Bund” in Federal 
Germany, around 13% of  GNP; and the proportion of  federal expenditures on GNP in Canada, about 16%. 
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other benefits. If  only because the Community budget is so relatively very small there is 
no such mechanism in operation on any significant scale as between member countries, 
and this is an important reason why in present circumstances8 monetary union is 
impracticable (p.12). 
After the creation of  the European Monetary System (EMS) and the European Currency Unit 
(ECU), the “Delors Report” vigorously re-launched the process, avoiding the call for full political 
and fiscal integration, but stressing the need for “coordination of  fiscal policies” (EC, 1989). The 
original architecture of  the EMU assumed that a mandate to the ECB to pursue price stability 
and safeguards against excessive government deficits would suffice to ensure macroeconomic 
stability (Obstfeld, 2013).  
Some authors specifically warned against the creation of  a unified currency without a federal 
insurance scheme cushioning the impact of  regional shocks, which “could very well lead the 
project to an eventual failure” (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). The lack of  such adjustment 
mechanisms was considered as potential sources of  risks (Eichengreen, 1991), whose major 
impacts would have fallen on labour, increasing the level of  unemployment over time (Feldstein 
1991, and 1997).  
The building criteria of  the EMU didn't take full account of  unemployment as a key indicator 
and “an all-out threat to monetary stability” (Dornbusch, 1996). It was decided instead to rely on 
a “vastly overdone insistence on fiscal criteria” (Dornbusch, 1997), which appeared even harmful 
to some scholars (Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini, 1993).  
As the former President of  the EC has recently reminded, however, in the EMU:  
it was the economic axis that was missing. I therefore proposed a pact for the co-
ordination of  economic policies to run alongside the monetary Stability Pact. This was 
not accepted. Instead, it was deemed sufficient to merely add the word ‘Growth’ to the 
name of  the Stability Pact. In reality, this was purely and simply a budgetary stability pact: 
no economic co-ordination; no instruments to stimulate, co-operate or regulate. (…) 
Everything continued without any serious disruption until the international financial crisis 
erupted. At that point, the inherent flaws of  EMU were revealed (Delors, 2013). 
Exchange rates were then irrevocably fixed in 1999, eliminating the currency exchange risk. The 
increase in trade between countries generated a higher degree of  sectoral specialisation within 
each country, which increased the likelihood for future external shocks to have asymmetric 
consequences (Kenen, 1969; Eichengreen, 1992; Krugman, 1993b). But in the absence of  a quick 
adjustment mechanism, like flexible exchange rates, the asymmetric effects can be amplified, 
instead of  absorbed, by a single monetary policy (Kaldor, 1971; De Grauwe, 2013).  
Meade (1957) argued that monetary rigidity in Europe might come at the expenses of  
employment, highlighting the risks of  pressures on labour and of  compromising the European 
social model. The underlying idea was that once countries lose their monetary policy, in the 
                                                     
8 At that time the Community Budget was equal to 0.7% of  GDP. Today it is 1.0%. 
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absence of  effective automatic stabilizers, the only possible adjustment mechanism to asymmetric 
macroeconomic shocks becomes internal devaluation. On the effectiveness of  internal 
devaluations, Friedman (1997) feared that:  
if  one country is affected by negative shocks that call for lower wages relative to other 
countries, that can be achieved by a change in one price, the exchange rate, rather than by 
requiring changes in thousands of  thousands of  separate wage rates, or the emigration of  
labour.  
This kind of  adjustment happens to be much slower, more painful, and less effective (Feldstein, 
1992). Economic historians often use the parallelism with the gold standard to illustrate the 
current crisis of  the Eurozone. That experience suggests that an asymmetric adjustment based on 
internal devaluation in debtor countries, with no corresponding inflation in the core, is 
economically and politically unsustainable (O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013). But while in that case the 
limited right to vote substantially allowed policy-makers to ignore the interests of  the workers 
who suffered most (Eichengreen, 1992; O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013), in modern democracies the 
universal suffrage does not. 
 
7. The EMU in the crisis 
At the time of  its inception the EMU satisfied to different extents some of  the conditions of  the 
OCA theory. Others, labour mobility in particular, improved over time, especially after the crisis 
hit the Eurozone. The only field in which no progress has been made is the common fiscal 
capacity. 
During its first decade the EMU seemed to invalid the importance of  the OCA criteria. The 
Eurozone did not experience major turbulences in that period, even if  not respecting those 
conditions, in particular a sizeable common budget (Mongelli, 2008; EC, 2008). 
The apparent contradiction with the condition prescribed by the theory is explained by what 
Mundell (1973) called ‘the private insurance channel’. Growing financial integration among EMU 
countries generated a spectacular increase in capital flows within the Eurozone, which acted as a 











Figure 3: Capital Flows in the Euro Area in % of  GDP (1993-2011)  
 
Source: Lane, P. R. (2013). Euro Area: Capital Flows in percent of  GDP. IMF BOP database. 
 
Unfortunately the financial crisis provoked the long-feared external shock, which challenged the 
solidity of  the architecture of  the EMU. The ‘private insurance channel’ instead of  acting as a 
stabiliser suddenly contracted. Its resilience and the sustainability of  a monetary union based on 
it proved weak. The explosion of  the government debt ratios after 2008 was the result of  a 
balance sheet recession triggered by the desire of  the private sector to reduce its excessive debt 
(De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). 
In the absence of  a monetary union, adjustment to shocks would happen via flexible exchange 
rates. In a complete monetary union, factors mobility and a relevant central budget act as 
automatic stabilisers. In the EMU none of  these mechanisms was available to counteract the 
crisis.  
The adjustment required within the Eurozone (mainly in the balances of  payment) had then to 
occur through prices and wages flexibility. As expected (Friedman, 1953) a deflationary policy 
aimed at reducing wage levels was applied in the deficit countries of  the Eurozone. Deflationary 
policies, however, may be economically ineffective and politically unsustainable in modern 
economies (O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013), and end up increasing the real value of  debts, putting 
pressure on indebted households, businesses, and financial institutions (Fisher 1933). 
This revitalized old worries that macroeconomic shocks in Europe might have “larger and longer 
lasting effects on relative unemployment (and) the adjustment to relative shocks in the European 
common currency area may turn out to be a painful and protracted process”, Blanchard et al. 
(1992). 
As expected, the Eurozone experienced an unprecedented rise in unemployment, whose intensity 
and duration differ from non-Eurozone EU countries and the US. 
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Figure 4: Unemployment rates in Eurozone, non-Eurozone EU, and the US 
 
Source: Eurostat and US Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
 
From 2007 to 2009 unemployment rose dramatically in the three areas, but while in the US it 
started decreasing since 2010, and in non-Eurozone EU countries it stabilized since then, in the 
Eurozone it rose abruptly in the last three years. This trend can be interpreted as a symptom of  a 
new crisis, very much specific to the EMU. 
This calls into question the shock absorption functions missing in the EMU. But while, as 
previously documented, labour mobility is playing a role in the current adjustment within the 
Eurozone, the missing ingredient is still the fiscal capacity. The architecture of  the Eurozone and 













Figure 5: Federal vs State level budgets in the Eurozone and the US  
Source: Eurostat and US Office of  Management and Budget. 
 
While the difference in the size of  the common (federal) budgets is well-known, it is more 
interesting to observe the dynamics of  the aggregates. Since the shock caused by the financial 
crisis in 2008, the reaction in the two areas has been different: in the US the big increase in 
government spending has taken place at the federal level, while in the Eurozone it has occurred 
at MS level.  
This dynamic has reinforced the divergences within the EMU, instead of  reducing them. The 
different sizes and behaviours of  the common (federal) budgets in the US and in the Eurozone 
seem to explain the different degrees of  internal divergences within the two areas. 
In the US, as a consequence of  the recent crisis, the state of  Florida experienced a strong burst 
of  a housing bubble pretty much similar to the one Spain had. But while Spain had to undergo 
very painful and not-so-effective internal devaluation, with huge fall in output and record-high 
unemployment, Florida could benefit from net fiscal transfers from the federal budget of  about 
5% of  the state GDP (Krugman, 2012). Unemployment in Florida went down, even below the 
national average, driven by massive out-migration, but this did not undermine its tax base as it 
will do in Spain, thanks to the federal insurance scheme.  
Labour mobility is playing a role in the current adjustment within the Eurozone too. Recent 
analyses show that labour out-migration in the Eurozone increasingly affects high skilled workers 
who migrate to occupy medium or low skilled jobs (EC, 2013). This phenomenon of  over-
qualification has risen in particular for movers from the periphery to the centre of  the Eurozone, 
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reducing the tax bases of  the outgoing countries, and initiating a vicious circle which in the end 
makes it more difficult to pay back debts (O’Rourke and Taylor, 2013).  
The state of  Nevada experienced a boom and burst cycle similar to the one Ireland had. Both 
banking sectors found themselves heavily in trouble and close to bankrupt, but in the US it was 
the federal government intervening. It has been estimated that the federal intervention amounted 
to a transfer of  more than 10% of  Nevada GDP (Gros, 2012). Ireland, instead, had to borne the 
full weight of  the intervention. This triggered a sovereign debt crisis, with consequent austerity 
policies and record-high unemployment. 
It is interesting to look also at the case of  Latvia. The Baltic republic was not yet a member of  
the Eurozone, but had a peg with the euro, which maintained even when it was hardly hit by the 
crisis. The price for maintaining the peg was a massive internal devaluation, which contracted 
national GDP by almost 25%. Unemployment rose dramatically, and a massive out-migration 
took place. This seems to mirror similar experiences of  US states, but what was missing in the 
case of  Latvia was the net fiscal transfer from a federal budget to compensate. Besides, in spite 
of  the adjustment via labour mobility and structural reforms, the Latvian economy is still far 
from recovering its pre-crisis levels of  GDP and employment. 
In the absence of  compensating mechanisms, the impoverishment of  some parts of  the 
Eurozone will increase in parallel to the increase in well-educated and qualified out-migration. 
Moreover, while in the process of  adjusting b-o-p imbalances deflationary policies have been 
implemented in deficit countries, expansionary policies have been missing in surplus countries 
(Lin and Treichel, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013).  
As a consequence of  this asymmetric adjustment to an asymmetric shock, and in the absence of  
a built-in fiscal stabilizer, imbalances in the unemployment rates within the Eurozone have 
literally exploded. The following figure shows a measure of  dispersion of  unemployment rates 





                                                     
9 All NUTS2 regions from Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland are included in EZ since the beginning, 1999. Estonia as well is included in EZ since 1999, 
because it had maintained a fixed exchange rate since then (15.6466). Greek regions are included in EZ since 
2000, non-EZ in 1999. Lithuania is in non-EZ for 1999-2001, and EZ since 2002, because it has maintained a 
fixed exchange rate since then (3.4528). Bulgaria is non-EZ for 1999-2005, and EZ since 2006, because it has 
maintained a fixed exchange rate since then (1.9558). Malta and Slovenia are non-EZ for 1999-2005, and EZ 
since 2006. Cyprus is non-EZ for 1999-2006, and EZ since 2007. Slovakia is non-EZ for 1999-2007, and EZ 
since 2008. Denmark and Latvia are part of  the ERM II like Lithuania (since 1999 and 2005 respectively). Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and UK are non-EZ. 
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Figure 6: Dispersion of  Unemployment rates in EZ and non-EZ NUTS2 Regions and US States 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of  Eurostat and US Bureau of  Labor Statistics data. 
 
Apart from the absolute value of  these dispersions, predictably lower in a complete federal 
system like the US, it is interesting to observe the tendencies over the last years. US states have 
experienced a limited increase in the divergences in unemployment rates, as a consequence of  the 
shock caused by the financial crisis. These differences are comparably much lower than in Europe 
and are decreasing, signalling a process of  common adjustment within the federation, led by 
labour mobility and fiscal transfers. The fiscal federalist system absorbs a substantial fraction of  
interregional shocks.  
EU countries with flexible exchange rates (non-Eurozone) have more similar levels of  
unemployment in their regions than before. This is probably given to the fact that the weight of  
the adjustment to the shock was absorbed by the exchange rates, before falling on the 
employment. 
The Eurozone lacks both mechanisms: neither flexible exchange rates, nor a complete federal 
state with full factor mobility and fiscal capacity. As a consequence of  this peculiar situation, and 
as foreseen by the OCA theory, the full burden of  the adjustment is transferred to labour, with 






8. A simulation of  a common budget 
The common fiscal capacity is the main missing element for the Eurozone to qualify as an 
optimum currency area. This had been the main concern of  that part of  the academic world 
which was more sceptical about the creation of  the EMU.  
The MacDougall Report conducted in 1977 an analysis of  the role of  public finances in the 
European integration, with a particular focus on the stabilisation effects of  a common budget. 
The report studied the extent to which inter-regional income differences within countries were 
reduced by central or federal public finances in eight case studies (Germany, UK, France, Italy, 
USA, Australia, Canada and Switzerland), finding that around 40% of  the differences were 
reduced by internal fiscal transfers, through the common national budget. 
The report also measured the public finance outflow/inflow of  each region in parallel with the 
relative current account position of  each region: 
Table 1: Public finance balance and balance of  payments from the MacDougall Report 
 
Source: MacDougall Report, 1977, page 33. 
The analysis showed that inflows to relatively poor regions were on average equal to 70% of  their 
current account deficits, while outflows from relatively richer regions were on average equal to 
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95% of  their current account surplus. This had an overall stabilisation effect, by reducing per 
capita income differences, of  40%. 
Given that levels of  disparities in income per capita across the Eurozone are not higher than 
those registered within countries, a similar order of  magnitude might be estimated for a common 
fiscal capacity at EMU level to have a similar stabilisation effect of  40%. 
In this case, we can consider the current account position in percentage of  GDP of  each 
Eurozone member state since 1999: 
Table 2: Current account balance in percentage of  GDP – 1999-2013 
 
Source: Ameco. 
By applying the lowest of  the two ratios suggested by the MacDougall Report (70%) to the 
current account surplus (or deficit) of  each country, we could estimate the needed contribution 
to (or by) a hypothetical common budget for every country, each year: 
Table 3: Simulation of  net contribution paid (+) or received (-) by each country (billions of  euros) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Ameco data. 
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It is evident that the biggest share of  the contribution in this simulation would fall of  the biggest 
economy, having also accumulated the highest current account surplus (Germany). The picture 
becomes even clearer if  we consider only the crisis period 2008-2013: 
Figure 7: Simulation of  the net contribution paid (+) or received (-) by each country (billions of  euros) before the crisis 
(1999-2007) and after (2008-2013) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Ameco data. 
The lack of  a sizeable common budget was the main design failure of  the EMU. The link to the 
current account position of  each member of  the Eurozone could have probably avoided the 
development of  the macroeconomic imbalances at the origin of  its specific crisis. The 




This paper joins the vast literature on the EMU as a sub-optimal currency area, proposing an ex-
post assessment in light of  the predictions of  the theory of  OCA. Four conclusions can be 
drawn from this analysis. 
First, the EMU did not experience major turbulences during its first decade of  existence, without 
much worry about the non-compliance with some of  the OCA criteria. The architecture of  the 
EMU was actually neutralising the two main lacking conditions: labour mobility and fiscal 
capacity. The first one was fulfilled only to a limited extent at the inception of  the Eurozone, but 
kept improving during the past years, with a particular boost in the years following the crisis. The 
22 
 
second one, instead, was missing, and still is, but found compensation in the private insurance 
mechanism, generated by the growing financial integration among EMU members. 
Second, if  the theory of  OCA proved too pessimistic for the first decade of  the EMU, once the 
long-feared external shock came, in the form of  a worldwide financial crisis, those old fears 
suddenly materialized. The reason is twofold. On the one side, the theory focused on the lack of  
adjustment mechanisms to asymmetric shocks, which did not happen until 2007, but occurred 
then with the deepest crisis since the Great Depression. The EMU found itself  deprived of  any 
common mechanism for shock absorption, and the response could only be generated at national 
level. This, in turn, exacerbated divergences within the Eurozone. On the other side, the private 
insurance mechanism contracted abruptly and proved weak and non-resilient as a response 
mechanism to asymmetric shocks. The main design failure of  the EMU became then dramatically 
evident. 
Third, as a consequence of  this inherent flaw in the EMU's architecture, and as it had been 
foreseen, the cost of  the adjustment after the shock fell mainly on labour, with much higher and 
longer term unemployment in the Eurozone, than in both non-Eurozone EU and the US. This 
might be gradually mitigated in the future by an increasing labour mobility within the Eurozone, 
from deficit to surplus countries. The lack of  a common fiscal capacity, however, implies that no 
mechanism will be in place to compensate those countries for the loss of  their most skilled 
workforce and for the erosion of  their tax bases. The impoverishment of  these countries will 
increase in parallel to the increase in labour mobility. 
Fourth, the analysis shows that as a consequence of  a series of  asymmetric responses to an 
asymmetric shock, with austerity policies in deficit countries not accompanied by expansionary 
policies in surplus countries, social and economic divergences in the Eurozone are literally 
exploding. A simulation for a common budget linked to the current account position of  each 
member state shows that its cost would be increasingly concentrated on one country: Germany. 
This may represent a challenge for the political sustainability of  the European project. 
The EMU seems locked into a vicious circle, which had been foreseen long ago: “monetary unity 
imposed under unfavourable conditions will prove a barrier to the achievement of  political 
unity”, Milton Friedman foresaw. But now political unity is precisely the necessary condition to 
save monetary unity. 
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